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Hopwood v. Taas: Strict in Theory or 
Fatal in Fact 
LESLIE YALOF GARFIELD* 
The recent decisions concerning the University of Texas School of 
Law's ("UT") 1992 affirmative action admission policy have created 
concern among post-secondary admissions committees. Until Hopwood 
v. Texas,,' schools were bound by the Supreme Court's 1978 decision 
in Regents of the University of California v. Bakkd when creating 
permissible affirmative action admission policies. However, the recent 
Fifth Circuit ~ o ~ w o o d  decision and the Supreme Court's decision to 
deny certiorari in that case4 leave unsettled the appropriate remedial 
measures law schools may adopt in their efforts to balance the tension 
between the goals of diversity and the legitimate interests of qualified 
non-minority candidates. 
This article will examine the Hopwood decisions. Part 11 will review 
the factual and legal history behind the case. Part III will discuss the 
District, Circuit, and Supreme Court decisions. Finally, Part IV will 
* Leslie Yalof Garfield, Assoc. Professor of Law, Pace University School of 
Law. The author gratefilly wishes to acknowledge Professor Lissa Griffin for her 
editorial assistance and Kerri Fredheim and Margaret Dupont for their diligent research 
and their tireless efforts. 
1. 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996)' cert. 
denied, 116 S.Ct. 2581 (1996). 
2. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
3. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct 2581 (1996). 
4. 116 S.Ct. 2581 (1996). 
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critique these decisions and offer a view into the future for affirmative 
action admissions policies.' 
A. The Facts of Hopwood v. Texas 
In 1992, UT used a dual admission policy to ensure its entering class 
was diverse in, among other things, race and ethnicity.' All applicants 
were reviewed in a similar manner. When rendering their decision, 
committee members were asked to consider such factors as undergradu- 
ate GPA, LSAT score, undergraduate major, race, gender, past work 
experience, and other relevant characteristics. The chairman of the 
admissions committee assigned one subcommittee to consider 
non-minority applicants and another subcommittee to consider minority 
ap~1icant.s.~ Consequently, when reviewing a particular file, a member 
of the minority subcommittee could not consider a particular application 
5. For a general discussion of the constitutionality of affirmative action 
admissions policies, see Leslie Yalof Garfield, Squaring APjimative Action Admissions 
Policies with Federal Judicial Guidelines: A Model for the Twenty-First Century, 22 J.C. 
& U.L. 895 (1996). 
6. The court noted that the diversity admission policy was not entirely voluntary 
because UT adopted the policy in response to the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) Texas 
plan. Nonetheless, the court concluded that under an equal protection analysis, the same 
level of scrutiny applied to race conscious affirmative action plans adopted pursuant to 
a consent agreement whether or not such plans were voluntarily adopted. Thus, the court 
would uphold the policy if it met the Supreme Court's requirement that (1) there was 
a compelling governmental interest, and (2) the policy was narrowly tailored to achieve 
the goals of that interest. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 569 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. 
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,274 (1986)). See also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 
U.S. 469 (1989); B u m ,  438 U.S. at 299. 
7. UT had two separate reviewing subcommittees. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 562. 
The Chair of the Admissions Committee set a different presumptive admission or denial 
Texas Index ("TI") number for minorities, who were reviewed by one subcommittee and 
for non-minorities who were reviewed by a separate subcommittee. Id. at 561. The 
Admissions Committee based acceptance to UT for all applicants on an index number 
that is a function of each applicant's combined undergraduate grade point average 
("UGPA") and LSAT score. Id. at 557 n.9. The Chair of the Admissions Committee 
initially reviewed all applications regardless of the applicant's residency, race or ethnic 
heritage and then set a number below which students were presumptively denied 
admission and another number above which students were automatically admitted to the 
school. Id. at 560-61. The subcommittees reviewed applicants with numbers between the 
automatic admission and the automatic rejection numbers. Id. at 561. The admissions 
office divided non-minority files into groups of thirty. Three members of the non- 
minority subcommittee reviewed each non-minority applicant on an individual basis. In 
contrast, the entire minority sub-committee reviewed each minority applicant as a group. 
In theory, each member of the minority subcommittee was to be part of the subcommit- 
tee to review non-minority files, however one member of the minority subcommittee did 
not review non-minority applications. Id. at 562. 
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with reference to a diverse group since he or she did not consider non-- 
minority applications. 
That same year, four individuals, all of them ~aucasian,8 applied to 
and were rejected from UT.9 Each applicant had a marginal application 
so that his or her LSAT and undergraduate grade scores were not 
suffkient for acceptance under the school's general admissions policy.10 
However, each of these applicant's test scores and grades were superior 
to many minority candidates accepted to the law school that year." 
8. John C. Brittain, The Hopwood Decision; Obituaiy for Afimative Action?, 
TEXAS LAWYER, May 13,1996 at 30. 
9. The denied a~~ l i can t s  were all white Texas residents. Ho~wood. 861 F. SUDD. 
at 564. Cheryl J. ~ o ~ ~ % o d ,  had a TI of 199, and Kenneth Elliott, ~ o u ~ l &  Carvell, &d 
David Rogers each had a TI of 197. Id. at 564-67. 
UT contested the ripeness of the claims of Hopwood and Elliott because neither was 
actually denied admission. Id. at 567. Moreover, UT maintained that all four applicants 
lacked standing because they could not demonstrate that they would have been granted 
admission absent the challenged admissions policy. Id. Because the plaintiffs were not 
considered for admission in a manner similar to minority students, the court ruled the 
applicants had standing to bring their claim. Id. at 567-568. See also Northeastern Fla. 
Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 
663-64 (1993). 
10. ' ~obwood, 861 F. Supp. at 563-67. 
11. Id. at 563 n.32. Cheryl Hopwood's UGPA was 3.8 and her LSAT was 39. Id. 
at 564. Her father Dassed awav when she was a voung child. While in hi& school. 
~ o ~ w o o d  was offeied admission into Princeton, P ~ M  gtate and Temple. ~h: declined 
admission, however, because she had to pay for her own education and work while 
attending both high school and college. Id. at 564 n.40. At the time of her application, 
she was married to a military serviceman and had two children, one of whom died at 
birth and the other who was diagnosed with severe birth defects. Sam Howe Verhovek, 
For 4 Whites Who Sued University, Race is the Common Thread, N.Y. TIMES, March 
23,1996, at A6. Hopwood declined to include any of this information in her application 
to UT. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 564, n.38. She did, however, submit a letter to the law 
school on January 22, 1992, requesting that if she were admitted, she would only be able 
to attend the school on a limited basis in her first year, due to the needs of her severely 
handicapped daughter. Id. at 564. Kenneth Elliott's UGPA was 2.98 and his LSAT was 
167. He is a certified public accountant, and since receiving his undergraduate degree, 
Elliott has worked as an auditor or examiner for state agencies. Id. at 565. Douglas 
Carvell's UGPA was 3.28. Id. at 566. After taking the LSAT twice, the first score being 
in the 61st percentile and the second in the 91st, his average score placed him in the 
76th percentile. Id. at 566 n.47. In a letter of recommendation contained in Carvell's 
admissions file, a professor from Hendrix College complimented Carvell's intellect, but 
described his performance as "uneven, disappointing, and mediocre." Id. at 566. David 
Rogers attained a UGPA of 3.13 and an LSAT score of 166. In 1985, Rogers was 
dismissed from the University of Texas (undergraduate program) due to poor scholastic 
performance. He then attended the University of Houston-Downtown, where he received 
his degree in professional writing in 1990. Id. at 567. 
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Following their rejection, a Texas lawyer contacted these and other 
applicants whom the school had rejected regarding a class-action suit. 
Plaintiffs agreed and permitted the lawyer to file a lawsuit on their 
behalf.12 The applicants challenged UTYs 1992 admission policy as 
violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.13 
B. Applicable Precedent 
1. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 
When the Hopwood lawsuit was filed, the only binding authority 
concerning an affirmative action admissions policy was Regents of the 
University of California v. ~ a k k e . ' ~  In B a k ,  the Supreme Court 
struck down an admissions policy that mandated race-based quotas. In 
so doing, the Justices wrote about the appropriate standard of review for 
such challenges and the viability of other race-based affirmative action 
admission policies.15 
In 1973 and 1974, Allen Bakke, a white male, was rejected from the 
University of California at Davis Medical School ("~avis").'~ Each 
- - -  
12. The lavryer, Steven W. Smith, became familiar with the case following his ovm 
investigation into what he perceived to be reverse discrimination. Under the Texas Open 
Records Act, Smith obtained the names of dozens of applicants with relatively high 
UGPAs and LSAT scores and mailed them letters requesting them to serve as plaintiffs 
in this case. Hopwood, Elliott, Carve11 and Rogers brought suit with Smith as their 
lawyer. Verhovek, supra note 11, at A6. 
13. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 553. 
14. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). For a general discussion of Balcke, see Garfield, supra 
note 5. 
15. Justice Powell, in the majority opinion, held that racial and ethnic distinctions 
are inherently suspect and call for the "most exacting judicial examination!' Regents of 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978). Similarly, Justices Brennan, White, 
Marshall, and Blackmun, agreed in their concurrence, noting that review under the 
Fourteenth Amendment must be strict though "not strict in theory and fatal in fact, 
because it is stigma that causes fatality - but strict and searching nonetheless!' Id. at 
361-362 (quotations omitted) (quoting Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Tenn- 
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer 
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972)). 
16. BaWce, 438 U.S. at 276. When Davis rejected Bal;ke in 1973, it had filled all 
the available seats for applicants from the general admissions pool, but there were still 
four open seats reserved for applicants from the minority pool. Id. In 1973, Mr. Bakke 
received a benchmark score of 4681500, but his application was late, and after his 
application was completed, no applicants in the general admission pool were admitted 
with a score below 470/500. At that time four seats in the special admission program 
were open, although Mr. Bakke was not considered for these seats. Mr. Bakke wrote to 
the Associate Dean and Chairman of the Admissions Committee, Dr. George H. Lowrey, 
to protest the admissions quotas. Id. Davis rejected Bakke again in 1974 although the 
school accepted minority applicants with lower test scores. In 1974, Mr. Bakke applied 
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year, Bakke was rejected while minority students Gth  less impressive 
academic credentials were accepted. Following the second rejection, 
Allen Bakke sued Davis in state court.17 He challenged the school's 
1973 admission policy, adopted in an effort to diversify its entering 
class, on the grounds that it operated to exclude him fiom the school on 
the basis of his race. The admissions policy, Bakke argued, violated the 
Equal Protection Cla~se , '~  the California Constit~tion,'~ and Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI).~' 
Davis' admission policy divided applicants into two groups. One 
group was comprised of non-minority applicants who had achieved a 
minimum 2.5 undergraduate GPA. The other was comprised of all 
minority applicants?' The school set aside a certain number of seats 
early, received high marks fiom a student interviewer, but received low marks from the 
faculty interviewer, who coincidentally was Dr. Lowrey. Lowrey gave him an 86, the 
lowest of his six scores, making his total 5491600 (there were six interviewers in 1974, 
so the total score was 600, while in 1973 there were only five interviewers so the score 
was out of 500). Under the special admission program, applicants were admitted with 
significantly lower credentials than Mr. Bakke. Id. at 277. 
17. Bakke sued for mandatory injunctive and declaratory relief Id. at 277. 
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 5 1, reads: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
19. CAL. CONST. art. I, 5 21, repealed and added (as amended) to art. 1, 3 7, 
reads: 
No special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted which may not be 
altered, revoked, or repealed by the Legislature; nor shall any citizen, or class 
of citizens, be granted privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, 
shall not be granted to all citizens. 
20. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 8 601, 78 Stat. 252 (1964) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. 5 2000d)(1989), reads: 
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national 
origin, be excluded fiom participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subiected to discrimination under any uromm or activity receiving: Federal 
- - 
finkcia1 assistance. 
21. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 27475. Those in the non-minority group were evaluated 
on the basis of their UGPA. MCAT score. and observations made during a ~ersonal 
interview conducted by a member of the Admissions Committee. The~dmmittee 
automatically rejected non-minority applicants whose UGPA fell below 2.5. Id. at 
273-74. In contrast, minority student applications were referred to a Special Admissions 
Committee comprised mainly of members of minority grqups. The minority applicants 
were rated in a manner similar to the applicants in the general applicant pool, except that 
a 2.5 UGPA did not serve as a ground for summary rejection. Thus, all minority 
applicants were considered for admission by the Special Admissions Committee, 
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for applicants in each of the groups?2 Individuals from the general 
applicant pool could not fill seats from the minority applicant pool, even 
if seats were a~ailable?~ 
The trial court found that Davis' admission policy was a racial quota 
and held that it violated the California and Federal Constitutions and 
Title VI?4 The California Supreme Court The State 
sought Supreme Court review and certiorari was granted.26 The 
Supreme Court, considering both the Equal Protection Clause and Title 
VI, affirmed the California Supreme Court decision to strike down the 
Davis admissions pol i~y?~ However, the Court was sharply divided. 
Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stevens, Stewart, and Rehnquist 
concluded that the program violated Title VI and, therefore found no 
need to consider the constitutional Justice Powell agreed that 
the Davis program was invalid since specific goals and quotas are 
always impermissible to achieve diversity or to dismantle discrimination. 
Thus, Justice Powell cast the "swing" vote and wrote the plurality 
opinion. 
regardless of their UGPA. Id. at 274-75. 
With the exception of the minimum UGPA for non-minorities, students were evaluated 
for admissions based on the same general criteria. However, each of the two Admissions 
Committees operated in a vacuum and did not compare its applicants to the other's 
applicant group. The Special Admissions Committee did not rate or compare minority 
applicants to the non-minority applicants but could accept or reject applicants based on 
failure to meet course requirements or other specific deficiencies. The Special 
Admissions Committee continued to recommend applicants until the number set by 
faculty vote were admitted. Id. 
22. Id. at 275. In 1968, when the overall class size was 50, the faculty set aside 
eight seats for minorities. In 1973 and 1974, the overall class size was expanded to 100, 
and the number of seats set aside for minorities was expanded to 16. Id. 
23. Id. at 275-76. 
24. Id. at 278-79. In reaching its conclusion, the trial court emphasized that 
minority applicants in the program were rated only against one another, and 16 places 
out of the class of 100 were reserved exclusively for minorities. Id. 
25. Applying strict scrutiny, it concluded that the program violated the Equal 
Protection Clause because it was not the least intrusive means of achieving the school's 
compelling goals, and that the program did not pass state constitutional scrutiny or the 
Title VI challenge. A majority of the Court concluded that an entity is prohibited from 
considering race in programs that use government funds. Id. at 279-80. Thus, Davis was 
ordered to admit Bakke into its medical school. Id. at 280-81. . 
26. Id. at 281. 
27. Id. at 266. A majority of the Court agreed that Davis must admit BaWte. At 
the Supreme Court level, UC Davis maintained that there was no private right of action 
under Title VI. Id. at 283. Hovrever, although the Court reached its decision based on 
the Equal Protection argument, it still recognized that a private right of action may exist 
under Title VI. Because the issue was not argued or decided below, the Court chose not 
to address "this difficult issue." Id. at 283. The Court also did not address the issue of 
whether private plaintiffs under Title VI must exhaust administrative remedies prior to 
bringing legal action. Id. at 283-84. 
28. See generally id. at 408-22. 
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In his plurality decision, however, Justice Powell wrote that some 
race-based remedial programs are permissible, but the Court must ensure 
that such programs do not violate the rights of Caucasians. Justices 
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun agreed with Justice Powell that 
there are instances where an affirmative action admission program is 
permissible and would have found that the Davis program did not violate 
the Equal Protection Cla~se.~' 
The proper standard of review for the Davis program was of 
significant concern to the five Justices who considered the program on 
constitutional grounds. Since the policy included "a classification based 
on race and ethnic background," it could only stand if it passed the strict 
scrutiny test3' Thus, the policy was permissible if it was "precisely 
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.'"' 
29. Id. at 325-26. These four Justices concluded that affirmative action admission 
policies enacted in response to Title VI are only valid to the extent that they co-exist 
with the Fourteenth Amendment. The Justices wrote that Title VI permits federally 
funded entities to enact programs or policies that assist minority groups to gain equal 
access to programs more easily available to Caucasians. However, Title VI and the Civil 
Rights Act do not take precedence over the constitutional protection of the Equal 
Protection Clause and thus such programs or policies are only valid to the extent that 
they co-exist with the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 325. 
30. Id. at 289. The Court has written that "'benign' carries with it no independent 
meaning, but reflects only acceptance of the current generation's conclusion that a 
politically acceptable burden, imposed on particular citizens on the basis of race, is 
reasonable" to correct for general discrimination. Metro Broad., Inc. v. Fed. Communica- 
tions Comrn'n., 497 U.S. 547, 610 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors Inc. v. 
Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). For an in-depth discussion of benign racial classifications, 
see Roy L. Brooks, The ABrmative Action Issue: Law, Policy, and Morality, 22 CONN. 
L. REV. 323 (1990). 
The ~etitioners kgued that the affirmative action admissions policy should not be 
subject to strict scrutiny since it was challenged by a white male and not by a member 
of a historically discriminated class of people. Justice Powell disagreed with this theory, 
recognizing that although the laws of discrimination are founded on a "two-class" theory 
of Black and White Americans, the Equal Protection Clause assures all persons the 
protection of equal laws regardless of the status of their particular racial or ethnic group. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 29495. See also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,369 (1886). In 
their concurrence, Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, agreed with Justice 
Powell, but wrote that the affirmative action admission policy did not mandate strict 
scrutiny but rather such a program is permissible if the court finds "(i) that there has 
been some form of discrimination against the preferred minority groups by 'society at 
large,"' and "(ii) that 'there is reason to believe' that the disparate impact sought to be 
rectified by the program is the 'product' of such discrimination." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 297 
n.36. 
31. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299. Justice Powell also wrote that "in 'order to justify the 
use of a suspect classification, a State must show that its purpose or interest is both 
Heinonline - -  34 San Diego L. Rev. 503 1997 
Justice Powell found a compelling governmental interest in attaining 
a diverse student body?' He wrote that "[A] diverse student body" 
contributing to a "robust exchange of ideas" is a "constitutionally 
permissible goal" on which a race-conscious university admissions 
program may be pre~licated.~~ However, although the Constitution does 
not bar admission policies fiom introducing race as a factor in the 
selection process, Powell concluded that ''blreferring members of any 
one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination 
for its own The Davis admission policy, which set aside a 
specXc number of seats for students in identified minority groups, 
d a i r l y  elevated the interests of a victimized group at the expense of 
other innocent individuals. For this reason, it violated the Equal 
Protection Clause?' Justice Powell's opinion did not preclude schools 
from considering race as a factor in instances where a program is free 
fiom clear racial preference or goals. Race or ethnic background may be 
constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification is 
'necessary. . . to the accomplishment' of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest."' 
Id. at 305 (quoting In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973)). See also Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964). 
32. "[Alttainment of a diverse student body . . . clearly is a constitutionally 
permissible goal for an institution of higher education. . . . The freedom of a university 
to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student bodv." 
B a k ,  438 U.S. i t  3 1-12. 
33. Id. Justice Powell noted that educational excellence is widely believed to be 
promoted by a diverse student body. Id. at 312. 
34. Id. at 307. "We have never approved a classification that aids persons 
perceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the expense of other innocent 
individuals in the absence of judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of 
constitutional or statutory violations." Id. 
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun agreed with this, stating that "Title 
VI clearly establishes that where there is a need to overcome the effects of past racially 
discriminatory or exclusionary practices engaged in by federally funded institutions, race 
conscious action is required to accomplish the remedial objectives of Title VI. Id. at 334. 
pitle VZ] does not bar the preferential treatment of racial minorities as a means of 
remedying past societal discrimination to the extent that such action is consistent with 
the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 328. 
35. Id. at 307-09. Justice Powell upheld the California decision that the special 
admissions program was unlawful, and that Mr. Bakke was to be admitted to medical 
school, but reversed the decision enjoining the medical school from considering race in 
admissions. Id. at 320. Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and 
Stevens, in a concurring opinion, agreed that the policy was unlawful because it unfairly 
favored one group over another. Id. at 325. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and 
Blackmun concurred in the holding and dissented in part, as they did not feel that Allen 
Bakke should be admitted to the Medical School and that quotas should be maintained. 
Id. at 379. They joined in Parts I and V-C. Id. at 328. Along with Justice Povtell, 
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun upheld the use of race in the 
admissions process, while Justices Burger, Stevens, Rehnquist, and Stewart considered 
the issue irrelevant to this case. Ron Simmons, /uWRMATIVE ACTION: CONFLICT AND 
CWGE IN HIGHER EDUCATION AF'IER BAKKE 2 (1982). 
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considered a "plus" in the admissions process?6 Thus, although Powell 
invalidated the program, his opinion made it clear that he would not 
necessarily invalidate all affirmative action admission pr0grams.3~ 
Justice Breman wrote that the Court has never adopted, as a proper 
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, the notion that the Constitution 
must be color-blind. In his opinion, Congress would not have adopted 
the Civil Rights Act, which encourages the elimination of discrimination, 
while at the same time "forbidding the voluntary use of race-conscious 
remedies to cure acknowledged or obvious statutory  violation^."^^ The 
Court has held that under certain circumstances, the remedial use of 
racial criteria is not only permissible, but is required to eradicate 
constitutional vi0lations.3~ 
The Bakke court set valuable precedent for challenges to race-based 
remedial programs. Under BaWce, state affirmative action programs or 
polices could not be upheld unless they were precisely tailored to serve 
a compelling governmental interest.40 Furthermore, states could not use 
goals or quotas to achieve racial diversity. However, according to five 
Justices, states may consider race as a factor when constructing 
affirmative action remedial plans. 
2. Post-Bakke Challenges 
Post-Bakke race-based remedial programs have been set in the 
employment arena and, are therefore challenged under Title VII of the 
36. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317. For example, assume two applicants, one minority and 
one non-minority, have the same UGPA and MCAT scores. Under Justice Powell's 
opinion, an admissions committee can offer admission to the minority applicant before 
it offers admission to the non-minority applicant since a diversity viewpoint "plus" 
UGPA and MCAT score is of more value to the school than a non-diversity viewpoint 
and the same "objective" test scores. 
37. Id. at 362. 
38. Id. at 336. 
39. Id. See North Carolina Bd. of Educ. v. Swam, 402 U.S. 43 (1971) (invalidat- 
ing a statute forbidding the assignment of students to school on the basis of race because 
it would hinder the implementation of remedies necessary to accomplish desegregation 
in the school). Students with pro-civil rights voices are silenced by professors who speak 
to the contrarv and do not call on them. Students need to hear in the classroom about 
"law in e v e j  day terms and fit to human needs" and not about "law insulated from 
cultural and intellectual diversity, and law focused on cumbersome sieges to the 
Constitution rather than on personal accountability and responsible legal administration." 
Dennis Graham Combs, Preachers of the Bar, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1993, at E19. 
40. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 325. 
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Civil Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause?' Through a series 
of cases considering the validity of race-based preference programs in 
the employment context, the Court has extended its Bakke ruling, that 
race-based policies are subject to strict scrutiny, to all federal and state 
race-based remedial programs. Furthermore, it has articulated a clear 
definition of the "strict scrutiny" test. A race-based program is constitu- 
tionally permissible when a court finds that there is a compelling 
governmental interest in a particular program or policy and that the 
disputed program or policy is narrowly tailored to achieve the govern- 
mental interest.42 
The Court has found that a need for diversity may support a compel- 
ling governmental interest where education is concerned, but has 
required proof of present effects of past discrimination for challenged 
race-based programs in the employment arena?3 A program or policy 
is narrowly tailored if the court finds that (I) there is a necessity for the 
relief and alternative remedies are less effi~ient;~" (2) the challenged 
41. Since Bakke, courts have rarely heard challenges against schools in vihich a 
plaintiff alleges that an affirmative action admission policy violated Title VI and the 
Equal Protection Clause. This is because a plaintiff did not have standing unless he or 
she could prove actual harm. The Court recently relaxed the standing requirement. In 
Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jackson- 
ville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993), the Court had to determine whether a Jacksonville program 
requiring that ten percent of d l  construction contracts go to Minority Business 
Enterprises was constitutional. The challenge was brought by the Northeastern Florida 
Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America (Northeastern). The City of 
Jacksonville argued that Northeastern did not have standing, as they could not shovr 
actual harm. Id. at 664. The Court held that in cases where the government erected a 
barrier that made it more difficult for members of one group to obtain a benefit, the 
members of that group did not have to show an injury in fact. Id. at 666. Instead, in 
order to prove standing, the group only had to demonstrate that it had difficulty in 
obtaining the benefit. Id. Such a showing, was enough to demonstrate a prima facie case 
of denial of equal treatment because of the program. Id. at 669. 
42. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097,2113 (1995). The purpose 
of ascertaining whether a compelling governmental interest exists is to "smoke out" the 
illegitimate uses of race by ensuring that the goal is in fact important. Hopwood v. 
Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 569 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), 
cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 2581 (1996) (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 
U.S. 459, 493 (1989)). The narrowly tailored analysis "ensures that the means chosen 
'fit' [the] compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive 
for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype." Croson, 488 U.S. 
at 493. 
43. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,280 (1986); Croson, 488 
U.S. at 488-89. 
44. See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n. v. Civil Service Comm'n. of New York, 463 U.S. 
582 (1983) (holding that relief is necessary where a federally funded entity predicates 
professional advancement on tests that yield a variable achievement rate for different 
races or ethnicities, even if done so unintentionally). 
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program is flexible and limited in durationt5 (3) there is a reasonable 
relationship between the numerical goals and the relevant labor 
marketf6 and (4) the relief has a minimal impact on the rights of third 
par tie^.“^ 
Since BaWre, the Court has extended application of the strict scrutiny 
test to all race-based remedial programs. However, it has never said that 
a race-based remedial program is impermissible. Thus, under these 
decisions, any race-based remedial program will be upheld if it is 
narrowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest. 
A. The District Court Decision 
In August, 1994, the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Texas issued its decision in Hopwood v. Texas ("'Hopwood 
r3. Applying strict scrutiny analysis, the district court, quoting Justice 
Powell in Bakke, found that a compelling governmental interest existed 
45. See, e.g., Croson, 480 U.S. at 171. See generally Croson, 488 U.S. at 514 
(striking down the Minority Business Enterprise legislation since it did not have either 
a specific termination date or, at a minimum, a provision for reviewing the legislation). 
46. See e.g., id. at 514. The Croson Court found that Richmond's statistical 
analysis was not narrowly tailored to its goal of increasing minority participation in 
contracting. Id. at 507-08. The legslation required primary contractors who were 
awarded Gty construction contracts70 subcontrkt at least thhy percent of the dollar 
amount of each contract to Minoritv Business Entemrises. Id. at 477-78. The Richmond 
legislature chose the numerical god of 30% based oh the percentage of minorities in the 
general population. Id. at 499. The Court found that since the City's goal of 30% 
minority sub-contractors reflected the general population and not the relevant population 
of minority contractors in the area, it was not narrowly tailored. Id. at 507. 
47. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987). BaWce struck down the 
Davis admission policy because it impermissibly granted admissions to minority 
applicants who would not otherwise have the opportunity to enter medical school over 
white males with higher test scores. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 
319-21 (1978). Davis' separate admissions committees, which were created to increase 
the number of minority physicians in the country, led to the medical school's unequal 
treatment of applicants. Id. at 310-1 1. In contrast, Paradise held that the one black to 
one white hiring requirement did not pose an unacceptable burden on white males 
because the program did not absolutely bar any non-minority individual's advancement. 
It merely 'postponed' the white males' advancement. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 182-83. The 
Court noted that under the program 50% of those promoted were non-minority, there 
were no layoffs, and the basic requirement that black troopers must be qualified still 
remain. The Court concluded that these provisions safeguarded the program against 
providing unequal treatment for individuals. Id. 
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in the school's 1992 admissions policy since the school's efforts were 
limited to "seeking the educational benefits that flow from having a 
diverse student body and to addressing the present eft'ects of past 
discriminatory practices.'** In other words, the compelling governmen- 
tal interest was supported by both the need to diversify the school's 
entering class and the present effects of past discrimination. The court 
concluded that without the diversity admission policy, UT would not 
have achieved a diverse student body?' Recent Office of Civil Rights 
findings coupled with the State's "long history of discriminating against 
Pllacks and Mexican Americans," and UT's history of racial discrimina- 
tion, were sufficient evidence to establish that the remedial purpose of 
UT's diversity admission policy constituted a compelling governmental 
interest?' 
Although the court concluded that UT had a compelling interest in 
using a diversity admission policy, the policy failed to pass constitutional 
muster because it was not narrowly tailored to meet the goals of 
diversity and reversing past discrimination. The court found that the 
diversity admission policy met the first three prongs of the narrowly 
tailored test.51 First, UT sufficiently demonstrated that the race-based 
admissions policy was necessary since it was impossible to achieve 
diversity without an affirmative action admission pol i~y?~ Second, the 
program was temporary in nature because the objective of UT was to 
narrow the gap progressively so that at some point in time UT would no 
longer need a diversity admission Third, UT's goals for 
48. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. 551,570 6V.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 78 F.3d 932 (5th 
Cir. 1996), cerr. denied, 116 S.Ct. 2581 (1996) (citing Bslcke, 438 U.S. at 313 
("environment fostering robust exchange of ideas makes goal of diversity 'of paramount 
importance in the fulfillment of [a university's] mission"'); Podberesky v. Itinvan, 956 
F.2d. 52,57 (4th Cir. 1992) ("race- related remedy may be used in an attempt to remedy 
effects of past discrimination"). 
49. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 572. If UT had considered minorities under the 1992 
general admissions policy, without regard to race or ethnicity, the admissions committee 
would have offered seats to 936 students. Id. at 563 n.32. Nine of these students were 
identified as African American and eighteen students identified themselves as Mexican 
American. Id. at 571. 
50. Id. at 572. 
51. Id. at 569-78. 
52. Id. at 573. The court also noted that the ultimate effect of abandoning the 
diversity admission policy would be to redirect minority students to the historically 
separate state law school at Texas Southern University, thereby segregating the la\-; 
school again. Id. 
53. Id. at 575. The court noted that the admissions committee regularly meets to 
review and to readjust the diversity admission policy to meet the current needs of the 
. school of law with regard to diversity. Id. 
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minority enrollment as a percent of total enrollment bore a reasonable 
relationship to the percent of minority college graduates in   ex as.'^ 
Ultimately, the court held that the diversity admission policy violated 
the Fourteenth Amendment because it failed to afford each individual 
applicant a comparison with the entire pool of applicants?' The court 
recognized the laudable and imperative goal of diversity in the education 
system. Moreover, it agreed with Justice Powell that race or ethnicity 
could be considered a "plus" factor in a school's consideration of a 
particular applicant?6 The court noted that when weighing 
non-traditional factors in the admissions decision, it is permissible for an 
admissions committee to choose an applicant with a lower LSAT andlor 
UGPA. Such an applicant may be preferable based on qualifications that 
include non-objective factors.57 Thus, the court ruled in a manner 
consistent with Bakke, holding that race can be a factor in considering 
a candidate's application for admission so long as a school does not use 
race to meet goals or to set quotas. 
The court permitted the law school to reconstitute its admissions 
policy, allowing it to consider race as a factor in admissions decisions, 
but requiring the school to review minority and non-minority candidates 
as a It awarded each plaintiff $1.00 in damages and granted 
plaintiffs the right to reapply to UT, without paying the requisite filing 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 579. 
56. Id. at 577 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 
(1978)). The court also recognized other schools with seemingly similar affirmative 
action admission policies. 
57. Id. Justice Powell noted that: 
"[tlhe applicant who loses out on the last available seat to another candidate 
receiving a 'plus' on the basis of ethnic background will not have been 
foreclosed from all consideration for that seat simply because he was not the 
right color or had the wrong surname. It would mean only that his combined 
qualifications, which may have included similar nonobjective factors, did not 
outweigh those of the other applicant." 
Id. 
58. Weeks before the trial began, UT modified its admissions plan. As of 
September 1, 1994, the admissions committee has consisted of one full time faculty 
member and the assistant dean of admissions. Race and ethnicity have continued to be 
factors, but the law school has removed its "presumptively deny" and "discretionary" 
categories and has reviewed all candidates that have not automatically been admitted 
based on their TI number. Janet Elliot, UTResponds to Suit with Policy Changes, TEXAS 
LAIVYER, May 23, 1994 at 10. 
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fees." Following this decision, UT appealed to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth ~ircuit .~" 
B. The Fzph Circuit Decision 
A three member panel61 for the Fifth Circuit decided Hopwood v. 
Texas (Hopwood LI) on March 18, 1996.~~ The court overturned the 
lower court decision permitting UT to reconstitute its 1992 admissions 
policy, and struck down the policy as violative of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu- 
ti0n.6~ A majority of the panel broadly ruled that UT may not use race 
as a factor in law school admissions, and suggested that every school in 
its jurisdiction is prohibited from doing the same.64 The panel also 
dismissed an appeal requesting intervention in the case by two black 
student groups for lack of juri~diction.6~ 
Judges Smith and ~ e ~ o s s ~ ~  rejected Justice Powell's holding in 
Bakkd7 that there is a compelling governmental interest in the attain- 
ment of a diverse student body. The judges wrote that Justice Powell's 
59. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 583. 
60. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct 2581 
(1996). The appeal for case number 94-50664 was filed on October 3,1994, by Cheryl 
Hopwood. The appeal for case number 94-50569 was filed on August 25,1994, by the 
Thurgood Marshall Legal Society and the Black Pre-Law Association. 
61. The panel's members were Judges Harold R. DeMoss, Jr., Jerry E. Smith, and 
Jacques L. Weiner, Jr. Judge Smith was a Reagan appointee. Both Judges DeMoss and 
Weiner were appointed by President Bush. Debbie Graves, Lawyer Says 4 Whites 
Wouldn't Make '92 Cut; As 'Marginal' Applicants, UT Says Affirmative Action Didn't 
Hurt Plaintirs, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, Aug. 9, 1995, at Al. 
62. 78 F.3d 932. 
63. Id. at 934-35. 
64. Id. at 944-46, 950. 
65. Id. at 959. The proposed interveners are tv~o black student groups from the 
University of Texas at Austin and its law school. The groups sought to intervene because 
they felt that UT would not effectively protect their interests in continuing racial 
preferences at the school. The district court denied their motion to intervene on the 
ground that the two associations and the law school did indeed have the same objective: 
to maintain the status quo. Id. At the close of the trial, but before judgment, the 
associations sought to intervene, raising two new defenses that were not represented 
during the course of the trial: 1) that the TI was an unconstitutional basis for admissions 
under Title VI, and 2) that affirmative action policies at the university were constitution- 
ally required. Id. at 960. The associations moved to reopen the record as interveners 
and introduce evidence supporting their new defenses. The district court, who reviewed 
the associations' claims de novo and on the merits, denied this motion. Id. at 960-61. 
When a prior panel discusses an issue on the merits, a later panel cannot amve at an 
adverse decision based on the preclusive principle of the "law of the case." Id. at 960. 
Consequently, because the lavr of the case doctrine prevents merit review, the Fifth 
Circuit affirmed the denial of the intervention motion for lack ofjurisdiction. Id. at 961. 
66. Judges Harold R DeMoss, Jr. and Jerry E. Smith. 
67. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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opinion in BaWce was not binding since it was not the general consensus 
of the court.6' In order to establish a compelling governmental 
interest, the judges looked to the Supreme Court's definition of a 
compelling governmental interest in Title VII employment discrimination 
cases. The judges would only find a compelling governmental interest 
if there were present effects of past dis~rimination.6~ 
As evidence of the present effects of past discrimination, the lower 
court relied on the Office of Civil Rights findings of discrimination 
throughout the law school and the entire UT system. In contrast, the 
Fifth Circuit majority defhed the proper unit for analysis of the effects 
of discrimination as the law s c h ~ o l ? ~  At UT, the judges held, there 
were no recognizable present effects of the law school's past discrimina- 
tion?' The majority concluded that since UT could not show prior 
discrimination by the law school, it could not use race as a factor in 
deciding which applicants to admit in order to achieve a diverse student 
body. 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Weiner agreed that the 1992 UT 
admissions policy did not pass strict scrutiny. The UT policy was not 
narrowly tailored to achieve diversity since it set one TI range for 
blacks, a different range for Mexican Americans, and a different range 
for other races."' However, he disagreed with the majority that 
diversity can never support a compelling governmental intere~t.7~ He 
wrote that Supreme Court precedent supports the proposition that 
achieving diversity in a public graduate or professional school could be 
68. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944. Similarly, in Bakke, the concurring opinion of 
Justices Breman, White, Marshall and Blackmun rejected Justice Powell's position that 
attaining diversity in a student body was a compelling governmental interest. In Bakke, 
the word "diversity" is mentioned nowhere except in Justice Powell's opinion. Id. 
Rather, Powell's four brethren noted that the "use of race to achieve an integrated 
student body" is constitutional if "necessitated by the lingering effects of past 
discrimination." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 326 n.1. Preferential treatment of racial minorities 
is permissible, they held, "as a means of remedying past societal discrimination to the 
extent that such action is consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment" Id. at 328. 
69. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 951. The law school argued that the court should look to 'Texas's 
well-documented history of discrimination in education." Id. at 948. The majority, 
however was unwilling to look at such a broad field. 
72. Id. at 936. 
73. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 962. 
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a compelling governmental intere~t.7~ Ultimately, Judge Weiner wrote 
that the definition and application of a compelling governmental interest 
where education is concerned, should be left to constitutional interpreta- 
tion, and he perceived "no 'compelling' reason to rush in where the 
Supreme Court fears-or at least declines--to tread.'"' 
C. The Supreme Court Decision 
On July 1, 1996, the Supreme Court denied the state's petition for 
certiorariy6 thereby letting the Fifth Circuit decision stand. Although 
there was no opinion accompanying the decisiony7 Justice Ginsberg 
wrote a brief concurrence, joined by Justice S0uter.7~ Justice Ginsberg 
denied certiorari because UT had already changed its 1992 admissions 
policy to reflect the district court decision, making the issue m00t.7~ 
However, Justice Ginsberg suggested that there would be a time in the 
future when the Court would address "the important question raised in 
this opinion."80 
IV. CLARIFICA~ON A D IMPACT OF HOPWOOD ECISIONS 
A. The Conflicting Definitions of Diversity 
Hopwood I and Hopwood 11 illustrate the different viewpoints of 
aflirmative action scholars. Hopwood I stands for the reaffirmation of 
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke. Although the Hopwood I court ruled 
out a dual admission policy that "insulated applicants" from review 
against each other:' it recognized the value the Supreme Court placed 
on diversity and its pronouncement that the need for diversity in 
education may serve as a compelling governmental interest for the 
purpose of satisfying the strict scrutiny test. 
h contrast, the Hopwood 11 court ruling means that a need for 
diversity may never support a compelling governmental interest for 
purposes of satisfying the strict scrutiny test. Under Hopwood 11, 
74. Id. at 964. 
75. Id. at 965. 
76. Texas v. Hopwood, 116 S.Ct 2581 (1996). 
77. Id. (writing, "[tlhe petition for a writ of certiorari is denied."). 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. (stating, "we must await a final judgement on a program genuinely in 
controversy before addressing the important question raised in this petition."). 
81. See also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,289-90 (1978). 
With the exception of separately reviewing minority candidates, the admissions 
committees treated applicants similarly. 
Heinonline - -  34 San Diego L. Rev. 512 1997 
Hopwood v. Texas 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
race-based programs in the educational setting are subject to the 
restraints the Court has placed on employment race-based remedial 
programs. Thus, in the Fifth Circuit, "any consideration of race or 
ethnicity by [a state school] for the purpose of achieving a diverse 
student body is not a compelling interest under the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment."s2 
Justice Ginsberg's concurrence in the denial of certiori suggests that 
the definition of a compelling governmental interest remains open for 
review. The Hopwood 11 decision creates a split in the circuits where 
education is concerned. The Hopwood I decision follows the seemingly 
applicable precedent set in Bakke and that diversity supports a compel- 
ling governmental interest in Title VI cases. In contrast, Hopwood 11 
held educational race-based policies to the same standard as employ- 
ment-related remedial programs. 
The Hopwood 11 majority was correct that as a general rule, the 
Supreme Court has been unwilling to permit race-based remedial 
programs unless the governmental entity can demonstrate present effects 
of past di~crimination.8~ However, it failed to recognize that the Court 
has carved out an exception where education is concerned. Beginning 
with Bakke, the Court has not required evidence of present effects of 
past discrimination in upholding educational race-based policies. This 
is because educational diversity equally benefits all students, regardless 
of race.'" Nor has the Court held that Title VI education discrimination 
cases are subject to the same analysis and requirements as Title VII 
employment discrimination cases?' 
82. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 
2581 (1996). 
83. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986); City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 488-89 (1989). 
84. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994), 
rev'd, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 2581 (1996). Under the current law, 
the goal of diversity is sufficient by itself to satisfy a compelling governmental interest. 
Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 571. See Shurberg Broad. of Hartford, Inc. v. Fed. 
Communications Comm'n., 876 F.2d 902,941 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. granted, Astroline 
Communications Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Shurberg Broad. of Hartford, Inc., 493 U.S. 
1018 (1990), rev'd, Metro Broad., Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n., 497 U.S. 547 
(1990). 
85. But see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2112 (1995) 
(reversing Metro Broad., Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n., 497 U.S. 547 (1990) 
(by extending the strict scrutiny test to federal programs)). 
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In Hopwood I1 the majority concluded that Justice Powell's opinion 
in BaMe was not binding since his opinion was merely a "swing vote" 
in the Court's plurality de~ision.'~ In fact, Pocvell's decision was not 
a "swing vote" since four other Justices would have gone further than 
Powell in permitting the use of race for remedial or diversity purposes. 
In Bakke, Justice Brennan, writing for Justices White, Marshall, and 
Blackmun, wrote that "UC Davis' goals of reversing minority 
underrepresentation in the medical profession justifies the school's 
remedial use of race. Thus, the majority reversed the judgment below 
since it prohibited universities from considering race as a factor in their 
admissions proce~s."~' Thus, five Justices endorsed the need for 
diversity to support a compelling governmental interest, not one Justice, 
as the Fifth Circuit panel incorrectly concluded. 
In Bakke, Justice Powell wrote most strongly about the benefits of 
diversity in education. He noted that these benefits flow two ways, 
minority students are brought into the classroom while non-minority 
students benefit from hearing the voices of others?' Thus, he wrote 
that diversity is an essential element of education in undergraduate 
school and in medical school. Quoting Sweatt v. Painter,Eg Justice 
Powell wrote that legal learning is ineffective "in isolation from the 
individuals and institutions with which the law  interact^."^' 
86. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944. 
87. See generally B a h ,  438 U.S. at 257-62. 
88. Id. at 313. Justice Pov~ell wrote that "[aln otherwise qualified medical student 
with a particular background . . . bring[s] to a professional school of medicine 
experiences, outlooks, and ideas that enrich the training of its student body." Id. at 314. 
Diversity better equips graduates "to render vrith understanding their vital service to 
humanity." Id. An environment fostering robust exchange of ideas makes the goal of 
diversity of "paramount importance in the fulfillment of [a university's] mission." Id, at 
313. Justice Powell further wrote that "whether it be ethnic, geographic, culturally 
advantaged or disadvantaged . . . [students] may bring to a professional school . . . 
outlooks, and ideas that enrich the training of its student body and better equip its 
graduates to render with understanding their vital service to humanity." Id. at 314. 
89. 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
90. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314 (quoting Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634). Since Bakke, various 
Justices have echoed Justice Pov~ell's opinion. In Metro Broad., Inc. v. Fed. Communica- 
tions Comm'n, the Court considered the validity of FCC policies granting preferential 
treatment based on race, Justice Breman, writing for the majority, wrote that "a 'diverse 
student body' contributing to a 'robust exchange of ideas' is a 'constitutionally 
permissible goal."' Mefro, 497 U.S. at 568 (quoting Bakke, 436 U.S. at 31 1-13). In 
Wygant v. Jacksonville Bd. of Educ., the Court reversed a decision upholding a 
bargaining agreement that lki ted the number of minority teachers the Board of 
Education would lay-off in order to preserve the ratio of minority to non-minority 
faculty. Four Justices recognized the compelling governmental interest in diversifying 
education. Justice O'Comor in her concurrence wrote that the "state interest in the 
promotion of racial diversity [in education] has been found sufficiently 'compelling."' 
Wygant v. Jacksonville Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986). Justices Marshall, 
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The Hopwood Ll majority wrote a seemingly disingenuous opinion. 
At the outset, the manner in which the court characterized the facts 
suggest it had its own social or political agenda. At times, the majority 
used language reminiscent of prohibited civil rights language, for 
example, it described the admissions waiting list as "~egregated."~' 
The majority characterized Justice Powell's opinion as both argumenta- 
tive and speculative. The majority also was sharply critical of the lower 
court decision. With reference to damages, the majority called the 
plaintiffs' victory "pyrrhic at best"?2 The majority further criticized 
the lower court for finding a compelling governmental interest in UT's 
1992 admissions policy, and rejected the notion that diversity in 
education is sufficient to support a compelling governmental interest. 
Breman, and Blackmun in their dissent agreed with Justice O'Connor that the state has 
a compelling governmental interest in diversifying education. Id. at 295, 306. 
When considering whether there is a compelling governmental interest in enacting a 
race-based preference policy, the Court evaluates the intrusion of a particular policy on 
innocent individuals. Although in an effort to eradicate racial discrimination the Court 
may uphold policies whereby "innocent persons may be called upon to bear some of the 
burden," any imposition must be strongly limited. Id. at 281. Thus in Wygant, a majority 
of the Court held that a preferential lay-off policy imposed too great a burden on 
innocent third parties since it translated into loss of an existing job for some innocent 
thud parties. Id. at 282-83. Chief Justice Burger, Justices Powell, Rehnquist, O'Connor 
and White reversed the decision of the sixth circuit. Four Justices suggested that race- 
based hiring goals might be more acceptable than a lay-off program since such a policy 
only resulted in denial of future employment opportunity and was therefore not as 
intrusive as the loss of an existing job. Id. at 283. 
91. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 938. "Such separate lists apparently helped the law 
school maintain a pool of potentially acceptable but marginal minority candidates." Id. 
The court noted that UT had a policy of reviewing minority applicants in the 
discretionary zone "differently from whites," although each reviewing process was 
identical. Id. at 937. 
92. Id. at 938. Powell argued that diversity of minority viewpoints furthering 
academic freedom is an interest under the constitution. Id. at 943. "Justice Powell 
speculated that a program in which race or ethnic background may be deemed a 'plus' 
in a particular applicant's file . . . [might] pass [constitutional] muster." Id. (quoting 
Bakhz, 438 U.S. at 317). Justice Powell argued that academic freedom, though not a 
constitutional right, has "'long . . . been viewed as a special concern of the First 
Amendment."' Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312). "[Justice Powell] intimated that the 
Constitution would allow schools to continue to use race in a wide-ranging manner." Id. 
at 944. "Justice Powell's argument in Bakke garnered only his own vote and has never 
represented the view of a majority of the Court in Bakke or any other case." Id. '"here , 
has been no indication from the Supreme Court, other than Justice Powell's lonely 
opinion in BaWce, that the state's interest in diversity constitutes a compelling 
justification for governmental race-based discrimination." Id. at 945. 
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The Fifth Circuit decision creates a clear split in the circuits. 
According to majority, race can no longer be considered a factor in the 
admissions process if the admissions policy is designed to promote 
diversity. However, in truth, the Hopwood 11 majority is merely a 
decision of two justices. It is reasonable to believe that this small panel 
could not effectively overrule 20 years of precedent. 
B. A Brief Glimpse into the Future 
Affirmative action proponents lament the judiciary's apparent trend 
toward eliminating af f ia t ive  action programs and p~licies?~ They 
disagree with Justice O'Connor's pronouncement in her majori a: opiniong4 in the 1995 decision of Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 
that the Court's affirmative action analysis may be "'strict in theory, but 
[it is not] fatal in fact."'96 Instead they read the Fifth Circuit's 
Hopwood 11 decision as another step toward curtailment of affirmative 
action polices and programs?7 
Justice Ginsberg's concurrence in the denial of certiorari suggests that 
the definition of a compelling governmental interest in educational race- 
93. See Joan Biskupic, Court Toughens Standarb for Federal Affirmative Action; 
Court Toughens US. Standardfor A@hnative Action, WASHINGTON POST, June 13, 
1995, at Al. 
94. Justice O'Connor delivered the majority opinion and was joined by Justice 
Kennedy. Justice Scalia and Thomas filed opinions concumng in part and concurring 
in the judgement. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Ginsberg 
joined. Justice Souter filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Ginsberg and Breyer 
joined. Justice Ginsberg filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Breyer joined. 
95. 115 S.Ct. 2097 (1995). Adarand considered the constitutionality of a federal 
statute that granted financial incentives to prime contractors who awarded subcontracts 
to companies controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. Id. at 
2102. Justice OYConnor, writing for the majority, considered the appropriate level of 
review for assessing whether the Federal program was permissible. She noted that prior 
to Adarand, "benign" federal racial classifications need only satisfy intermediate 
scrutiny. See Metro, 497 U.S. at 564-65 ("benigny' federal racial classifications are 
permissible if they serve important governmental objectives within the power of 
Congress and are substantially related to achievement of those objectives). This was in 
sharp contrast to the Court's requirement that the Equal Protection Clause demands strict 
scrutiny of "benigny' State or local race-based preference policies. A maioritv of the 
Adarad Court had  that the same more stringenf standard should apply to ail raf e-based 
preference uolicies regardless of who is inwlementing the ~olicv. since the strict scrutinv 
iest "ensuri[s] that &e personal right t d  equal prztectibn ot'the laws has not be& 
infringed." Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 21 13. 
96. Id. at 21 17 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., 
concurring). See also supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
97. See Brittain, supra note 8; Linda Seebach, Race-Based Programs are on Their 
Way Out, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Sept. 3,1996, at B6; David Jackson, Justices Let 
Admissions Ruling Stand; Effect on Affirmative Action Debated, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS, July 2, 1996 at Al; Aaron Epstein, Schools in 3 States Can't Consider Race, 
POST & COURIER, July 2, 1996 at A3. 
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based programs remains open to Supreme Court consideration. When the 
Court deems the issue of defining a compelling governmental interest in 
Title VI cases as ripe, it could choose to overrule Justice Powell's Bakke 
opinion. In that event, a need for diversity could no longer support a 
compelling governmental interest in Title VI race-based remedial 
programs. Instead, an educational institution defending its affirmative 
action admissions policy would need to present proof of present effects 
of past discrimination in order to maintain such a program. 
Requiring proof of present effects of past discrimination in Title VI 
cases would overrule Bakke and would vitiate the reasoning behind the 
distinction between a compelling governmental interest for purposes of ' 
Title VI education cases, and Title VII employment cases. Justice Powell 
wrote of the benefit of diversity to all individuals in the classroom 
regardless of race or ethnicity. Both minorities and non-minorities 
enhance their educational experience with exposure to differing 
viewpoints. In contrast, race-based remedial programs in the employ- 
ment sector more directly benefit the minority group they are designed 
to assist. When eradicating discrimination in the employment sector, 
"innocent persons may be called upon to bear some of the burden of the 
remedy."98 
Because of the burden non-minorities feel in the work place when 
race-based affirmative action admission policies are employed, the Court 
held that there must be a clear presentation of the present effects of past 
dis~rimination?~ The Court has held that the need for role models for 
future minorities is insufficient to support a compelling governmental 
interest where there is no benefit to non-minorities.lm The support for 
requiring proof of present effects of discrimination in the workplace is 
inconsistent with extending this burdensome requirement to Title VI 
programs if one is to accept Justice Powell's opinion of the value of 
diversity in the classroom. 
The Court's decision to deny certiorari in Hopwood is troublesome 
since it lets the Hopwood ,?I decision stand in the Fifth Circuit. 
However, Justice Ginsberg's  dissent^ should be read to mean that the 
Court did not endorse the Fifth Circuit decision, but rather refused to 
take a case considering the issue was moot. Given the Court's 
98. Wygant v. Jacksonville Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,281 (1986). 
99. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 165 (1987). 
100. City o f  Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,497-98 (1989). 
Heinonline - -  34 San Diego L. Rev. 517 1997 
reluctance to overmle itself, the latter may be the better view and one 
could hope that should a justiciable case come before the Court in the 
future, it will serve as a vehicle to reafiirm Justice Powell's decision in 
B a h .  
The Hopwood decisions leave educational institutions uncertain as to 
the appropriate measures they may take to ensure diversity' in the 
classroom. The Fifth Circuit prohibits schools from creating race-based 
admissions policies, and instead forces schools to create admissions 
policies based primarily on past academic performance. Such narrow 
requirements will yield an admission pool similar to that of the pre-Civil 
Rights Act era that initially prompted adoption of race-based remedial 
programs. 
The split created by the Fifth Circuit did not prompt the Supreme 
Court to clarify whether the Circuit's decision to adopt a Title VII 
analysis to Title VI cases is legally sound. Instead, the Court has written 
that it will wait to respond to this issue until a justiciable case comes 
before it. Until that time, the rest of the country must wait too. 
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